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FOREWORD TO THE NEUROSCIENCE, LAW &
GOVERNMENT SYMPOSIUM
Jane Campbell Moriarty∗
It is with much pleasure that I write the foreword for this
Symposium in the Akron Law Review. The authors were each
presenters at the Neuroscience, Law & Government Conference, held at
The University of Akron School of Law in September, 2008. The
articles in this edition of Akron Law Review are as diverse as the
presentations themselves, and provide a fascinating glimpse into various
ways in which neuroscience is making inroads in both law and
government.
The explosion of neuroscience and neuroimaging discoveries this
decade is nothing short of remarkable, leading one prominent scientist to
term the last several years “the decade of the mind.”1 Neuroscience has
become a dominant aspect of scientific inquiry—there are now over
35,000 members of the Society for Neuroscience, a group which
integrates scholarly work from scientific, mathematic, psychological,
medical, and computer-based disciplines.2 The emergence of functional
magnetic resonance imaging, commonly termed “fMRI,” has
substantially affected basic cognitive neuroscience research.3 Indeed,
according to an article published in Nature in 2008, it appears as though
there are roughly 19,000 peer-reviewed articles that may have used
fMRI in some capacity.4

∗ Professor, The University of Akron School of Law, and Chair, Neuroscience, Law & Government
Conference at The University of Akron School of Law, September 2008.
1. Steven Rose, Introduction: The New Brain Sciences, in THE NEW BRAIN SCIENCES:
PERILS AND PROSPECTS 3 (Dai Reese & Steven Rose eds., 2004).
2. JONATHAN D. MORENO, MIND WARS: BRAIN RESEARCH AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 17
(2006).
3. Nikos K. Logothetis, What We Can Do and What We Cannot Do with fMRI, 453 NATURE
869, 869 (2008).
4. Id.
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There are numerous instances where neuroscience intersects with
law or government and the Conference at the University of Akron
School of Law concerned many of them, including the use of
neuroscience to detect deception as a defense to a crime, and as a
method by which to explain the reason for a juvenile’s unlawful
behavior. In addition, Conference speakers considered the role of
neuroscience in legislation related to gender issues, whether it should be
used as part of death penalty decision-making, and the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment implications of neuroscience evidence.
The legal and legislative systems have begun to rely on
neuroscience in various types of decision-making. Without question, the
relationship between the disciplines will become more enmeshed as
more data is generated by neuroscientists. Are we ready for this
potential sea change that will be both rich and strange?5
The Symposium begins with the comments of Professor Henry T.
Greely, the keynote speaker, who provides an annotated version of his
presentation. His talk focused on five ways neuroscience might affect
the law: the areas of prediction, mind reading, responsibility, treatment,
and enhancement.6 Professor Greely sketches a glimpse of where the
science might bring us, while recognizing the uncertainty of predicting
the future.
Professor Greely first discusses the use of neuroscience as a
predictive element in the law—what if we could use neuroscience to
predict who will be likely to develop conditions such as Alzheimer’s
disease or schizophrenia or who will become dangerous psychopaths?
Should the law allow employers and others to use this kind of predictive
information? Should it use these predictions itself at trial or to stop
people before they commit dangerous acts? If so, how?
Neuroscience also intersects with law, Professor Greely argues, by
the use of neuroimaging methods, such as fMRI to view the brain in
action; in a sense, to “read minds.” From experiments to determine what
objects people are seeing (or visualizing) to studies to determine if
minds can move prosthetic limbs, neuroscience is growing at a rapid
pace. Other, more legally-oriented uses of neuroscience are likely as
well—to detect pain, bias, and deception. Much of the Conference
focused on the neuro-detection of deception and many of the articles in
this Symposium discuss this issue.

5. Cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST, Act I, Scene II.
6. Henry T. Greely, Law and the Revolution in Neuroscience: An Early Look Across the
Field, 42 AKRON L. REV. 687(2009).
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Whether neuroscience has a role in the determination of legal
responsibility is a subject about which there is much scholarship and
current discussion. Noting the extreme polarization between those who
believe neuroscience will replace the law and those who believe it
provides nothing new, Greely suggests a likely middle path, where it
will make a difference in some cases, but will be unlikely to lead to
major changes in our view of criminal responsibility.
The fourth intersection between neuroscience and law may be in
the area of treatment, Professor Greely writes. We may be able to
improve human health by finding better ways of managing disease. But
might we also find ways to treat such disorders as anti-social behavior?
And if so, what dangers does such knowledge present? Should we
forcibly treat criminals with neuro-techniques that pose grave dangers to
those “treated”? Citing the current treatment of sex offenders with drugs
that bring about “chemical castration,” Professor Greely wonders about
the potential side effects and voices concerns about such brain-based
treatment.
Finally, Professor Greely’s keynote presentation delves into the use
of neuroscience drugs to enhance performance. Some drugs are
currently being developed to enhance memory, while other machinebrain interfaces (such as cochlear implants for hearing loss) are already
in use. But rather than simply treating disabled people, what if we
decide to use these drugs simply to enhance normal abilities? What is
the proper role of law for regulating such enhancements?
In sum, Professor Greely’s article looks into the future and, while
claiming not to know what the future will actually bring, argues that the
law will soon have to deal with neuroscience issues.
Several of the articles in this symposium consider different aspects
of the intersection of neuroscience and testing for deception. Professor
Joelle Moreno’s article provides an important philosophic link for those
thinking about the role of the academy in evaluating novel scientific
evidence such as neuroscience. Noting that “profound validity questions
divide cognitive neuroscientists,” Professor Moreno cautions against
ready admission of cognitive neuroscience evidence, recognizing that
the images presented may be far more persuasive to judges and juries
than they legitimately should be. Quoting studies on the effect of
neuroscience evidence in forming opinions, she reminds readers that
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cognitive neuroscience evidence can “strongly sway opinion, beyond
what the evidence can support.”7
My article on the neuroscience of deception primarily looks at the
fMRI studies of neuroimaging and discusses the reasons why such
studies do not yet meet standards of evidentiary trustworthiness.
Drawing on the lessons from courts’ decisions to admit much forensic
science without proof of its validity or reliability, the article argues
against ready admission of such evidence in the courtroom. Rather, it
counsels in favor of an informal moratorium, while scientists and their
critics consider and debate the neuroscience of deception, and other
scholars consider the moral, jurisprudential, and ethical implications of
such evidence.8
Dr. Dov Fox’s in-depth article explains how the forced use of
neuroscience to detect deception violates the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.9 Drawing the historical distinction in Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence between testimonial and physical evidence,
Dr. Fox recognizes that brain imaging is “difficult to classify because it
promises distinctly testimonial-like information about the contents of a
persons’ mind . . . in demonstrably physical-like form . . . .”10
Nonetheless, he concludes that our thoughts are much more “part of us”
than our blood. So while our blood can be taken from us without
violating the Fifth Amendment, the same is not true of our thoughts.
While Dr. Fox focuses on the Fifth Amendment implications of
forced use of neuroscience, Professor Christian Halliburton delves
deeply into the Fourth Amendment’s implications with respect to
neuroscience use.11 Arguing in favor of an expanded notion of property
as an essential aspect of human identity, Professor Halliburton
challenges existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as being too
narrowly cabined in its ability to protect the government from forcibly
protecting the thoughts emanating from one’s mind. Suggesting we
“immolate” the current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that centers on
a privacy notion, he argues in favor of a personhood theory of property
7. Joëlle Anne Moreno, The Future of Neuroimaged Lie Detection and the Law, 42 AKRON
L. REV. 717, 738 (2009) (quoting David P. McCabe & Alan D. Castel, Seeing is Believing, The
Effect of Brain Images on Judgments of Scientific Reasoning, 107 COGNITION 343, 349 (2008).
8. Jane Campbell Moriarty, Visions of Deception: Neuroimages and the Search for Truth, 42
AKRON L. REV. 739 (2009).
9. Dov Fox, The Right to Silence as Protecting Mental Control, 42 AKRON L. REV. 763
(2009).
10. Id. at 794.
11. Christian M. Halliburton, How Privacy Killed Katz: A Tale of Cognitive Freedom and the
Property of Personhood as Fourth Amendment Norm, 42 AKRON L. REV. 803 (2009).
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to apply to the Fourth Amendment, drawing heavily from Margaret
Radin’s theories.12 Professor Halliburton calls for a ban on the
government’s non-consensual use of neuroscience on individuals,
arguing that “the cognitive landscape of our ideas and intentions are so
closely bound up with the self that they are essential to our ongoing
existence and manifestation of a fully developed personal identity.”13
Professor Michael Perlin, an international authority on the insanity
defense, discusses the future implications of neuroimaging technology in
insanity defense cases.14 Building upon his belief expressed in books
and articles that “sanism” and mythic beliefs infect the jurisprudence of
the insanity defense, Professor Perlin questions whether neuroimaging
will change those concerns.15 Since the technology is both vivid and
quantifiable, it has the potential to counter many of the myths of the
insanity defense. Nonetheless, Professor Perlin is ambivalent as to
whether neuroimaging will truly affect the insanity defense or whether
the prejudices and stereotyping related to the defense will simply
accommodate this new evidence. His article provides an interesting and
thoughtful analysis premised on a long history of scholarship in the area
of behavioral science.
Professor Aronson’s article focuses on the connection between
neuroscience and juvenile justice. He discusses whether the new
neuroscience provides sufficiently reliable evidence to establish
meaningful differences between adolescent and adult brains and whether
science should mitigate the culpability of juvenile defendants and
prevent them from being tried in the adult criminal justice system.16 He
concludes that there is still too much scientific disagreement about the
relationship between brain structure and decision-making capacity to
even contemplate using neuroscience in this way. He notes that the few
studies that have shown some link have had significant methodological
flaws. In the end, Aronson is not convinced that neuroscience will be
able to explain adequately why some teenagers commit crimes and
others do not because so many other factors are involved in anti-social
behavior, especially socioeconomic issues. He concludes by suggesting

12. Id. at 840-47, discussing Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 957 (1982).
13. Halliburton, supra note 11, at 869-70.
14. Michael Perlin, “His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill”: How Will Jurors
Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 885 (2009).
15. For more on these subjects, see id. at 887 n.8.
16. Jay D. Aronson, Neuroscience and Juvenile Justice, 42 AKRON L. REV. 917 (2009).
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that our desire to find a scientific solution to questions of justice may be
fundamentally misguided.
Professor Julie Seaman’s remarks provide an interesting
comparison between the “black box” of the jury room and the “black
box” of the mind in her essay, questioning what will be revealed if
neuroscience evidence on truthfulness is admitted at trial.17 Discussing
the recognition that jury nullification has often had the salutary effect of
acting as a safety valve for exceptional cases, she muses about how
neuroscience evidence relating to truthfulness might affect the exercise
of that role.
Professor Tovino’s annotated remarks focus on the newly
developing role of neuroscience in legislation about women’s medical
conditions.18 Discussing some of the small neuroscience studies
addressing post-partum mood disorders, premenstrual dysphoric
disorders, and eating disorders, Professor Tovino explains how
advocates have begun to use the studies to attempt to affect legislation.
As her research reveals, advocates are using neuroscience to help
establish a physiological basis for these disorders so that these
conditions will be given parity with other physical disorders.
Previously, these disorders were considered solely mental disorders,
which categorization limits the amount of medical coverage available for
prevention and treatment. While these attempts to use neuroscience are
laudable, Professor Tovino, like many of the scholars in this
Symposium, cautions against inferring too much from the small, few
studies that exist to date.
This symposium, in its variety of articles, touches upon many of the
key issues as neuroscience moves into both law and government.

17. Julie Seaman, Black Boxes: fMRI Lie Detection and the Role of the Jury, 42 AKRON L.
REV. 931 (2009).
18. Stacey A. Tovino, Remarks: Neuroscience, Gender, and Law, 42 AKRON L. REV. 941
(2009).
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